The Effects of Time Pressure on Temporal Overestimation Due to Threat by Tipples, Jason et al.
 
The Effects of Time Pressure on Temporal 
Overestimation Due to Threat 
 
Jason Tipples​1,​†​,​*, Michael Lupton​2,​* and David George​2 
 
1 ​
Psychology Group,​ ​Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK 
2​
Department of Psychology, University of Hull, Hull, UK 
 
Received 17 August, 2020; accepted 18 December, 2020 
 
† Joint first authors. 




How does emotion change the way we perceive time? Studies have shown that we overestimate the 
duration of faces that express anger of fear — an effect that has been explained as due the speeding of a 
pacemaker that resides within an internal clock. Here, we test the idea that attending longer to facial 
threat leads to an overestimation of time. Seventy participants (16 male) estimated the duration of angry, 
fearful and neutral expressions under conditions designed to either reduce attention to time (by 
emphasising speedy responses) or lengthen attention to time (by emphasising accuracy). Results were 
modelled using Bayesian Multilevel Logistic Regression. The results replicate previous findings: speed 
emphasis reduced temporal sensitivity and led to both a higher overall proportion of long responses and 
faster reaction times. Facial threat attenuated the drop in temporal sensitivity due to speed instructions 
supporting the idea that people prolong attention to threat (even when they are not directly instructed to 
do so). We relate the findings to research into attention bias to threat and more broadly to models of 




Our perception of time changes when we feel aroused. For example, people typically 
overestimate the duration of faces expressing states of high arousal (e.g., Doi & 
Shinohara, 2009; Fayolle & Droit-Volet, 2014; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2011; Gil et al., & 
Droit-Volet, 2007; Tipples, 2011) and moreover, this effect is increased in individuals 
with high levels of anxiety and self-reported fearfulness (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Tipples, 
2008, 2011). One explanation for this effect is that emotion speeds a pacemaker that 
resides within an internal clock. Here, we test the idea that people prolong attention to 
angry and fearful expressions, and this causes the overestimation effect. To do this we 
examined the effects of time pressure (Klapproth & Müller, 2008; Klapproth & 
Wearden, 2011) on time estimates for angry and fearful expressions. 
Researchers have used the temporal bisection task to test whether faces 
expressing states of high arousal might distort our perception of time. Specifically, in a 
pioneering study (Droit-Volet et al., 2004) participants were asked to judge whether 
angry, happy, sad and neutral facial expressions were displayed for a duration that was 
more similar to either a standard short or a long duration that they had learnt earlier. 
Participants responded long more frequently following angry, happy and, to a lesser 
extent, sad facial expressions compared to neutral facial expressions. In other words, 
emotional expressions were judged to last longer; time was overestimated. The finding 
is both reliable — it has been replicated repeatedly — and also, a valid indicator of 
emotional reactivity — it is associated with individual differences in emotion (including 
anxiety) and occurs in response to a variety of emotion-evoking stimuli. A key question, 
however, is how emotional stimuli affect time. Two explanations have been given — 
pacemaker speeding (described next) and attention. 
One ​explanation for the effects of facial expressions on time perception is that 
emotional arousal increases the rate of a pacemaker mechanism that resides within an 
internal clock. Internal-clock models of timing (Gibbon​ ​et al., 1984; Rammsayer & 
Ulrich, 2001; Treisman, 1963; Treisman​ ​et al., 1990; Zakay & Block, 1997) typically 
include: (1) a pacemaker that emits units of time (or pulses) at specific rate, (2) an 
attention-controlled switch that controls the flow of pulses, and (3) a counter where 
perceived time is calculated based on the total number of counted units. One variant of 
this basic model includes an attention-controlled gate (Block & Zakay, 1996; Zakay & 
Block, 1995) that precedes the switch mechanism — the gate opens wider when more 
attention is allocated to time. One prediction of the internal-clock model is that the 
effects of pacemaker speeding will multiply as duration increases. In the temporal 
bisection task, a multiplicative pattern for emotion would be recorded if emotion 
increased the gradient of the psychophysical ​slope ​for duration. The multiplicative 
nature of pacemaker speeding has been compared to the additive effects that are 
thought to reflect the closure of the switch mechanism. In the internal-clock model, the 
switch closes when timing starts to allow units of time to enter the counter. The switch 
reopens when timing ends. Delays in the closure and reopening of the switch are 
expected to be additive with increases in time because they occur in an ‘all-or-none’ 
manner leading to the addition (or subtraction) of a fixed number of units of time. In the 
temporal bisection task, an additive pattern for emotion is indexed by a shift in the 
intercept​ of the psychophysical slope​ ​for duration. If emotion delays the closure of the 
switch then timing will start later and time will be underestimated — a rightward shift in 
the psychophysical function for emotion. If emotion delays the reopening of the switch, 
then timing will end later, and time will be overestimated leading to a rightward shift in 
the psychophysical function for emotion. 
Emotional stimuli both increase arousal and lead to overestimation and 
therefore, the effects have been attributed the effects of emotion on time to pacemaker 
speeding due to arousal. A pattern of underestimation — suggestive of a delay in 
opening of the switch — has been reported for emotionally arousing images (Lui et al., 
2011). However, in the latter study emotional stimuli were irrelevant distractors 
interleaved between two timing stimuli — a stimulus context that may have created 
attentional competition. Most studies have presented the emotion stimuli as the 
to-be-timed stimuli and have reported an overestimation rather than underestimation 
of time. 
Although overestimation rather than underestimation is typically reported for 
emotion stimuli, a multiplicative overestimation pattern — expected for pacemaker 
speeding — has not been reported consistently across studies. For angry facial 
expressions specifically, some studies have reported a multiplicative pattern 
(Droit-Volet et al., 2004) whereas other studies have recorded an additive effect (e.g., 
Fayolle & Droit-Volet, 2014). An additive overestimation effect supports the idea of a 
slower reopening of the switch mechanism and therefore, evidence is equivocal with 
respect to the pacemaker-speeding account. 
Isolating arousal-based, pacemaker-speeding effects from attentional effects is 
made difficult for several reasons. First, an initial fast arousal effect might give way to 
attentional effects. Second, there is more than one variety of attention that needs to be 
considered. Specifically, sustained rather than the initial orienting of attention might 
mediate the effects of emotion on timing. As noted recently (Lake et al., 2016) a general 
assumption of pacemaker accumulator models is that full attention is given to the 
stimulus under normal conditions and consequently attention can only be distracted 
from timing. This assumption may hold for highly motivated laboratory rats on which 
the internal-clock models was based but seems less likely for research participants who 
wish to leave the laboratory quickly. An individual who fails to sustain attention to the 
full stimulus duration will have a shallower psychophysical slope for duration compared 
to an individual who always attends to the full duration (Matthews & Meck, 2016). 
However, when participants are motivated to look at an image — a person staring at 
them in a threatening manner for example — it makes sense to keep attention tightly 
fixed on the person for as long as possible and not let attention waiver during stimulus 
presentation. In short, attending to an image for longer because it has motivational 
relevance (e.g., a picture of spider to a spider-phobic or a fearful face to a participant 
who is generally anxious) is one way in which attention might mediate the effects of 
emotion on time estimates. 
A manipulation that either prolongs or shortens attention to the longest 
durations is one way of testing the prolonged-attention account for an overestimation 
effect for facial expressions and other emotion stimuli. If participants attend longer to 
emotion stimuli compared to neutral stimuli then the prediction is that emotion will 
attenuate or lessen any manipulation designed to reduce attention to time. One 
manipulation that is thought to reduce attention to the longest durations is time 
pressure. The effects of time pressure on time perception were originally studied by 
Klapproth and colleagues (Klapproth & Müller, 2008; Klapproth & Wearden, 2011) 
using the temporal generalisation task. In the temporal generalisation task, participants 
judge whether a comparison duration is either the same as or different from a standard 
duration. Plotting the proportion of same responses against the comparison duration 
reveals a temporal gradient. Klapproth and colleagues found that time pressure shifted 
the temporal generalisation gradient leftwards — overall participants responded ‘same’ 
more frequently irrespective of the actual duration of the comparison stimulus. Less 
consistently, time pressure also reduced the temporal gradient itself. Klapproth and 
colleagues’ interpretation of their findings was that under time pressure participants 
shortened their timing of the longest durations and consequently, the average 
experience of time was ‘truncated’ under time pressure compared to accuracy emphasis. 
Building on the research of Klapproth and colleagues, our hypothesis is that if 
participants prolong attention to emotion stimuli for the longest durations then this will 
attenuate the effect of time pressure. 
 
1.1. This Study 
 
To provide some consistency with previous studies of the effects of emotion on time 
estimates we used the temporal bisection task rather than the temporal generalisation 
task used by Klapproth and colleagues. A between-subjects design was used — 
participants were randomly assigned to either time pressure or accuracy conditions. In 
the accuracy condition participants were instructed to be as accurate as possible. In the 
time pressure condition, responding quickly was emphasised and feedback was given as 
"too slow" if responses were slower than 500 ms. There were several predictions. First, 
compared to the accuracy condition participants in the time pressure will respond faster 
and show a flattening of the psychophysical slope for duration. A flattening of the 
psychophysical slope due to time pressure is expected because this is the pattern that is 
also found in studies of magnitude estimation more generally (see for example; Ratcliff, 
2014). The central prediction is that the flattening of the psychophysical slope for 
participants under time pressure will be smaller in magnitude for threat-related (angry 






Seventy undergraduate psychology students were randomly assigned to either the speed condition (mean 
age = 21, 7 males and 28 females) or the accuracy condition (mean age = 23, 9 males and 26 females). The 
mean self-reported trait fearfulness scores did not differ between participants in the accuracy condition 
(​M​ = 10.05; SD =1.97) and participants in the speed condition (M = 8.85; SD =1.97), ​F​




 = 0.02. 
 
2.2. Materials and Apparatus 
 
The face stimuli were the same as those used in a previous study (Tipples, 2011) that recorded an 
overestimation effect for angry and fearful expressions compared to a neutral face that grew in magnitude 
for individuals with high self-reported levels of anxiety and fearfulness. The stimuli were created using 
software from a commercial company called Poser 5.0 (Curious Labs Inc., Santa Cruz, CA, USA). In 





All participants completed learning and test phases. In the learning phase, participants were trained to 
discriminate short (400 ms) from long (1,600 ms) stimulus durations. On the first eight trials, a pink oval 
appeared for either a short or long duration in a fixed sequence (e.g., long–short–long–short, etc.). 
Participants were told to expect this sequence and to press either the Z or M button on a computer 
keyboard to indicate whether the oval appeared for either a short or a long duration. The response 
mapping (e.g., Z for short durations and M for long durations) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Following a response, participants were presented with visual feedback lasting 500 ms, for both correct 
(‘yes’) and incorrect (‘no’) decisions. The feedback was followed by a fixed 1000 ms inter-trial interval. In 
the final stage of the learning phase, the pink oval was presented for a further eight trials in a new random 
order for each participant. Participants continued to indicate whether the oval appeared for either short or 
long stimulus durations and received feedback. 
During the test phase, the oval was replaced by the face stimuli. Participants were asked to (a) 
look at the face and (b) indicate whether the face appeared for a duration that was closer to either the 
short or long durations that they had learnt earlier. In the test phase, there were 21 possible trial types 
that were derived from the factorial combination of duration (400, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400 600, 1600) × 
expression (angry, fearful, neutral). Participants in the speed were instructed: "Please respond as quickly 
as possible. Accuracy is not crucial" and given the feedback "Reaction time too slow" if their reaction times 
were longer than 500 ms. Participants in the accuracy group were instructed: "Please respond as 
accurately as possible. Speed is not important". We wanted to make all other aspects of the task as similar 
as possible to that used in previous research and therefore in the test phase feedback was not given for 
accuracy. There were eight repetitions of the 21 trial types leading to the creation of 168 trials. A new 
randomised trial order was created for each participant. Finally, after the main test phase participants 




3.1. Reaction Times 
 
An initial manipulation check was conducted to establish whether participants in the 
speed condition responded more quickly than those in the accuracy condition. 
Specifically, the mean reaction times (RTs) were analyses in an expression (neutral, 
angry, fearful) × duration (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600) × condition (speed, 
accuracy) mixed ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects variable. The ANOVA 
revealed main effects for condition, ​F​
1,68​ = 182, ​p ​ < 0.001, η​p​2​ = 0.73 and duration, ​F​1,68​ = 
5.50, ​p​ = 0.022, η​
p​
2​
 = 0.07 and an interaction between condition and duration, ​F​
1,68​ = 
9.78, ​p​ = 0.003, η​
p​
2​
 = 0.13. All other effects failed to reach the convention for statistical 
significance (alpha = 0.05). Figure 1 shows the mean RTs in seconds as a function of 
duration and condition. The interaction shows that: (1) RTs were faster in speed 
condition and (2) participants were slowest responding as the decision became harder — 
as the duration approaches the mean (1000 ms) of the durations. For the participants in 
the speed condition the effect was linear — RTs became faster as the durations 
lengthened. 
 
3.2. Hierarchical Bayesian Logistic Regression 
 
Following Tipples (2019), the ‘short’ and ‘long’ responses for each trial were modelled in 
a multilevel Bayesian logistic regression. Details of model selection and further aspects 
of the modelling procedure can be found in the Supplementary appendix. To permit 
comparison with previous research that has not used the Bayesian approach we 
conducted supplementary frequentist analyses. These analyses can also be found in the 
Supplementary appendix. Figure 2 displays the mean proportion of long responses for 
each combination of expression (neutral, angry, fearful), duration and condition (speed, 
accuracy). 
In the Bayesian framework statistical inference can be made directly on the 
posterior distribution of the regression model coefficients. The coefficients can be used 
to calculate indices such as the Weber ratio (WR) and the Bisection Point (BP). The BP 
refers to point of subjective equality (0.5 point on the psychometric function). The WR 
is an index of temporal sensitivity and is calculated by dividing the difference limen ​(half 
of the difference between the stimulus durations giving rise to ​75% long responses and 
25% long responses) ​by the BP (see also; Tipples, 2019). ​Relatively lower WR values 
indicate a greater sensitivity to time. The WR and BP have been repeatedly used in 
previous research on this topic and therefore, we calculated these indices from the 
posterior distribution of the fixed-effect regression coefficients. 
Boxplots for the WRs and BPs are plotted as a function of expression and 
condition in Figures 3 (WRs) and 4 (BPs). Figure 3 shows that there was a marked 
reduction in temporal sensitivity for participants in the speed compared to the accuracy 
condition. However, as can be seen in Fig. 3, the key result is that in the speed but not 
the accuracy condition WRs were lower (indicating greater temporal sensitivity) for 
angry and fearful faces compared to neutral faces. The regression coefficients support 
this observation. Specifically, the 95% credible values for the three-way expression (fear 
vs neutral) × duration × condition (speed vs accuracy) interaction contrast did not 
contain the value zero [​β​ = 0.0.0013; 95% credibility interval (CrI) = 0.0003–0.0023]. 
The three-way interaction contrast for angry expressions did contain zero, (​β​ = 0.0008; 
95% CrI = −0.0002–0.0018). However, it would be a mistake to argue for the null (‘zero 
effect;’) in this condition. Instead, we express greater uncertainty over the non-null 
value of this effect — we are 80% rather than 95% certain that the effect does not 
contain zero (80% CrI = 0.0001–0.001). 
Figure 4 shows that the probable BP values in the accuracy condition (left panel) 
were closer to mean duration (1000 ms) than those in the speed condition. In other 
words, instructions to be accurate improved accuracy. Also, in the accuracy condition 
the BPs were shifted to the left for angry and fearful faces compared to neutral faces. 
However, the effect was relatively small (<35 milliseconds) for both comparisons. For 
the contrast fearful–neutral, 80% of the probability mass did not contain the value zero 
whereas for the contrast angry–neutral 95% did not contain zero. The same contrasts 
for the speed condition are difficult to interpret because shifts in the BP are not 
independent from shifts in the WR and, as the above analysis shows, temporal 
sensitivity was higher (WRs were lower) for angry and fearful expression compared to 
the neutral expression condition in the speed condition. Finally, in keeping with the idea 
that time pressure truncates temporal experience by reducing attention to the full 
duration (Klapproth & Müller, 2008; Klapproth & Wearden, 2011) the median BP values 
in the speed condition are all below 1000 ms and moreover, the BPs in the speed 
condition are shifted left relative to the accuracy condition. This reflects relative 
overestimation (the psychometric function is shifted upward on the ​Y​-axis) and would 
be expected if (1) the average experience duration was relatively shorter in the speed 
condition and (2) this mean was used as comparison duration that a specific duration 




The results offer support for the prolonged-attention hypothesis that people attend 
longer to threat-related expressions and consequently this leads them to overestimate 
time. When participants were instructed to respond quickly, fearful and angry 
expressions increased temporal sensitivity as indicated by a steepening of the 
psychophysical slope for duration. This finding is consistent with the idea that people 
spent longer attending to angry and fearful faces compared to neutral faces and 
consequently they responded long more often as the duration lengthened. For 
participants given instructions to be as accurate as possible, there was a leftward shift in 
the BP for angry and fearful expressions compared to neutral expressions. However, this 
overestimation effect was small in magnitude and moreover, increased temporal 
sensitivity due to facial threat was absent. Our interpretation of the pattern of results in 
the accuracy condition is that increased attention to neutral stimuli led to a reduction in 
the usually observed overestimation effect for threat-related expressions. Put 
differently, we think that the usually observed overestimation effect for emotion 
depends on participants not fully paying attention to neutral stimuli. The fact that a 
small effect of facial threat remained is most likely due to the weak manipulation of 
accuracy we used — participants were not given feedback but rather accuracy was 
stressed via verbal instructions. In sum, our results support a central role for attention 
in mediating the effects of facial threat on time estimates. 
How can the proposed attention effects be explained in terms of the putative 
mechanisms of the internal-clock model? Within internal-clock models, it is possible to 
distinguish between the role of selective attention in starting and ending the timing 
process and sustained attentional effects that operate throughout the duration of the 
stimulus (Fernandes & Garcia-Marques, 2020; Matthews & Meck, 2016; Ogden et al., in 
press). In the internal-clock model selective attention is needed at the beginning of the 
stimulus to close the switch and once at the end of the timing processes to reopen the 
switch. Such effects are thought to produce additive (‘intercept’) effects on timing, 
namely left or rightward shifts of the bisection curve. Sustained attention can be 
conceptualised as affecting the clock operation in two ways. First, sustained attention 
might be necessary to keep the switch closed and prevent lost pulses via an opening and 
closing or ‘flickering’ (Lejeune, 1998) of the switch. Second, within the Attentional Gate 
Model (AGM; Block & Zakay, 1996; Zakay, 1989) sustained attention can be 
conceptualised as controlling the width of an additional gate mechanism that precedes 
the switch. In the AGM, the gate controls the effective flow of the pulses from the 
pacemaker to the accumulator and therefore, when the gate is narrower fewer pulses 
accumulate as time progresses. In either case, a stimulus that increases sustained 
attention such as a threatening stimulus will lead to a reduction in lost pulses across 
time and an increase in the gradient of the psychophysical curve reported both here and 
separate research (Tipples, 2019). 
Although an attentional account has been proposed to account for the effects 
reported here it is unlikely that such effects operate independently from arousal. Indeed, 
sustained attention is sometimes used synonymously (within attentional models) to 
refer to increased alertness due to arousal. According to one well-known model of 
attention (Petersen & Posner, 2012) alertness can be differentiated from focused or 
selective attention in that it is (1) not spatially selective — it operates across the visual 
field — and (2) is dependent on the locus coeruleus–norepinephrine (LC–NE) system 
rather than the more localised brain systems for orienting attention ​and executive 
control (see Fig. 2; ​Petersen & Posner, 2012). 
The results also replicate and extend previous reports (Klapproth & Müller, 2008; 
Klapproth & Wearden, 2011) by showing that the effect of time pressure (speed 
instructions) on time estimates generalises to the temporal bisection task. Specifically, 
in keeping with the idea that time pressure truncates temporal experience by reducing 
attention to the full duration (Klapproth & Müller, 2008; Klapproth & Wearden, 2011) 
the median BP values in the speed condition were all below 1000 ms and moreover, the 
BP in the speed condition was shifted left relative to the accuracy condition. This reflects 
relative overestimation (the psychometric function is shifted upward on the ​Y​-axis) and 
would be expected if (1) the average experience duration was relatively shorter in the 
speed condition and (2) the mean duration used as a comparison duration was 
represented by a lower value. In the accuracy condition, however, the median BP values 
clustered around the mean duration (1000 ms) as would be expected if participants 
attempted to perceive time accurately by attending to the full duration of the faces. 
More broadly, the flattened psychophysical slope for duration (due to time 
pressure) is consistent with findings from perceptual decision-making research into the 
speed–accuracy trade-off. For example, in one task (Experiment 10; Ratcliff, 2014) 
participants were asked to decide whether the distance between two dots was large or 
small. Instructions to respond quickly reduced the gradient of the psychophysical 
function — participants were relatively more indiscriminate as they rushed to respond in 
time. Here, we found an analogous effect — compared to instructions to be accurate, the 
psychophysical function reduced in gradient. Our interpretation is similar too — 
collecting more evidence before making a decision (by attending longer to the stimulus) 
leads to slower but more precise decisions. 
Speed–accuracy trade-offs in perceptual decision making are frequently modelled 
using the sequential sampling models of decision making. Studies that have used the 
drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) to model the 
effect of time pressure on perceptual decision making have shown that speed 
instructions lead to reduction in the boundary separation parameter — the model 
parameter that governs the amount of information required for a decision. Large 
boundary separation values indicate conservative response criteria (more information is 
required for a decision) whereas smaller values indicate more liberal and perhaps 
impulsive response criteria (less information is required for a decision). This boundary 
separation parameter was not modelled in previous research (Tipples, 2015) that used 
the temporal bisection task to study the effect of emotion on temporal decision making. 
It was not modelled because modelling this parameter is difficult using this task 
specifically (Balcı & Simen, 2014). However, based on the current research, modelling 
this parameter might yet provide insight into the basic process that underlies the effect 
of emotion on time. The prediction for boundary separation is that emotion will increase 
the boundary separation parameter as participants collect more data before making a 
decision. 
The specific roles for attention and arousal are by no means settled by the current 
work. Instead, our work shows that increased time pressure might be necessary for 
revealing attentional processes. Future work will need to consider how the effects 
reported here change across different duration ranges, tasks, and stimuli. Comparing 
duration ranges will be insightful for two reasons. First, past work indicates that 
attentional and arousal processes might have different time courses. For example, one 
study (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012) found that the arousal-based effect produced by the 
perception of emotional pictures was short-lived (< 1 s). Second, replicating across 
duration ranges permits testing for a multiplicative pattern — the expected pattern for 
pacemaker speeding due to arousal. Finally, using different tasks (e.g., verbal 
estimation) will be useful because the temporal bisection task might not be sensitive to 
the subtle interplay between attention and arousal across time. 
In summary, the current findings support the hypothesis that participants attend 
longer to threat-related expressions and this leads to an overestimation effect. This is 
consistent with the effects of emotion on timing reported in previous research (Lui et al., 
2011) and more broadly consistent with the idea that people prolong attention to facial 
threat (Fox et al., 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005). In short, the results facilitate the 
understanding of this effect in relation to effects recorded outside the time perception 
literature and more specifically, shed light on our understanding of the effects of facial 
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Figure 1. ​Mean reaction times (RTs) in seconds as a function of duration and condition. Error bars are 
bootstrapped 95% CIs. 
 
Figure 2. ​The mean proportion of long responses for each combination of expression (neutral, angry, 
fearful), duration and condition (speed, accuracy). The points are the mean bisection values from the 
fitted model. 
 
Figure 3.​ Boxplot of Weber ratios as a function of expression and condition. The boxplots were created 
from the posterior distribution of the fixed effect regression coefficients. 
 
F​igure 4. ​Boxplot of bisection points (in milliseconds) as a function of expression and condition. The 
boxplots were created from the posterior distribution of the fixed effect regression coefficients. 
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To permit comparison with previous research that has not used the Bayesian approach we also 
conducted frequentist (non-Bayesian) analyses. Specifically, we estimated a psychometric 
curve for each person for each expression and condition, by modelling the number of long 
responses using a binomial generalized linear model (GLM) with a logistic link function in R (R 
Core Team, 2018.​ ​R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. https://cran.r-project.org). Then, the bisection point (BP) 
and Weber Ratio (WR) were calculated in the same way (described in the text) used to calculate 
these indices for the Bayesian Model. Both the BPs and WRs were subjected to a mixed 
ANOVA with expression (angry, fearful, neutral) as the within-subjects variable and condition 
(accuracy, speed) as the between-subjects variable. The Greenhouse–Geisser correction for 
sphericity was applied to the degrees of freedom. For the analyses of BPs there was a clear 
main effect of condition​ ​(​F​1,68​ = 182, ​p​ < 0.001), reflecting lower BPs for the speed (​M ​= 877) 
compared to the accuracy condition (​M ​= 1027). There was also a main effect of expression 
(​F​1.92,130.69​ = 4.73, ​p​ = 0.01), reflecting lower bisection points for angry (​M ​= 932) compared to the 
neutral expression (​M ​= 973; ​t​69​ = 3.53, ​p ​= 0.0009). The contrast between neutral and fearful 
expressions (​M ​= 951) was not significant (​t​69​ = 1.61, ​p ​= 0.11). The expression × condition 
interaction was also not significant for BPs​ ​(​F​1.92,130.69​ = 0.65, ​p​ = 0.51). For the analyses of WRs, 
the expression × condition interaction was significant (​F​1.79,121.45​ = 3.65, ​p​ = 0.03). There was a 
simple main effect of expression in the speed condition (​F​1.61, 54.84​ = 5.75, ​p​ = 0.009) but not the 
accuracy condition, ​F​1.82,61.85​ = 0.31, ​p​ = 0.71. In the speed condition, WRs were lower 
(indicating higher temporal sensitivity) for fearful (​M​ = 0.18) compared neutral expressions (​M​ = 
0.23; ​t​34​ =2.12, ​p ​< 0.05). WRs were also lower for angry (​M​ = 0.19) compared to neutral 
expressions although the effect approached rather than reached significance (​t​34​ =1.84, ​p ​= 
0.07). Overall, the pattern of results matches the Bayesian analyses. 
